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Recordkeeping and Reporting in an Attempt to
Stop the Money Laundering Cycle: Why Blanket
Recording and Reporting of Wire and Electronic
Funds Transfers is Not the Answer
Without the ability to freely utilize its ill-gotten gains, the underworld
will have been dealt a crippling blow.
-Irving R. Kaufman'
In 1984, the President's Commission on Organized Crime
drew attention to large-scale "money laundering"2 operations that
criminal organizations had used to disguise the amount and
source of their illegally-gained profits.' The Commission's report
suggested changes in the applicable federal law, in an effort to
make more costly and difficult the process of disguising and con-
cealing illegally earned cash.' Until the Commission's report, law
enforcement efforts to detect and control money laundering re-
lied mainly on provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act.5 The Act im-
posed requirements on banks to report their customers'
transactions, when these transactions involved large amounts of
cash.6 Banks' compliance with the reporting requirements was
lax, however, and money laundering itself, as opposed to failure
to file the required reports, was not a crime. Spurred by the
Commission report's revelations about the size of the sums being
1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT To THE PRESI-
DENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINAN-
CIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING iii (1984). Statement of Irving R. Kaufman,
Chairman of the President's Commission on Organized Crime [hereinafter THE CASH
CONNECTION].
2 Money laundering is defined as "the process whereby one conceals the existence,
illegal source, or illegal application of income, and then disguises that income to make it
appear legitimate." Id. at 7. The Commission was careful to point out that corporations,
as well as drug traffickers, may engage in money laundering. For example, a corporation
seeking to cover the trail of bribery money paid to foreign officials will make use of launder-
ing techniques. Id. at 11-12.
3 Id. at 10-13, 29-49.
4 Id. at 52-63.
5 Amendments to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (Bank Secrecy Act), Pub L.
91-508, Titles I and II, 84 Stat. 1114-1124 (1970) (current version codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959; 18 U.S.C. § 6002; 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5314, 5316-5322
(1988)).
6 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1988).
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"laundered," and the role money laundering plays in keeping
drug trafficking and other illegal activities profitable, Congress in-
creased the penalties for Bank Secrecy Act violations. It also made
money laundering a substantive crime.
7
Yet, evidence indicates that the money laundering business is
bigger than ever.8 This means that drug traffickers and other
criminals still have access to their recycled and disguised profits.
Revelations about the scale of recently uncovered money launder-
ing operations have impelled legislators and law enforcement offi-
cials to propose additional banking regulations to address the
money laundering problem. These proposals focus on wire trans-
fers, particularly international wire transfers,9 which money laun-
derers use to quickly move funds from one domestic or interna-
tional financial institution to another. The speed and relative ano-
nymity of electronic and wire transfers'0 have made the "trail" of
illegally generated cash nearly impossible for law enforcement
authorities to trace.
But proposals to require financial institutions to keep records
and file reports on these transactions are not likely to do much
to stop money launderers. The proposed regulations, like those
currently in force, will require financial institutions to record, and
in some cases report, detailed information about tens of thou-
sands of individual financial transactions per day. The sheer vol-
ume of information recorded and reported means the govern-
7 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Subtitle M of Title I of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended
throughout 18 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.).
8 See, e.g., infra notes 23-24.
9 Electronic and wire transfers can move funds in a matter of seconds, because
what is being "moved" is not physical currency, but messages. An authority on electronic
funds transfer has notedi
Money itself is nothing but information. It represents the claims that individuals
and institutions have for goods and services that exist within an economy. The'
possession of money in any paper form is simply the possession of a certificate
which records these particular claims. The movement of money is the movement
of these claims through the accounting records of the financial, industrial, and
merchandising communities. That's the essential meaning of electronic funds
transfer.
D. CHORAFAS, ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANsFER 142 (1988).
In April, 1989, Donald G. Ogilvie, vice president of the American Bankers Associa-
tion, wrote to William J. Bennett, then-director of the Office of National Drug Control
Policy, stating: "Wire transfers . . . have emerged as the primary method by which high-
volume launderers ply their trade." Cox, New Path for Money Laundering, AMERiCAN
BANKER, July 24, 1989, at 9.
10 See infra notes 34 and 35 and accompanying text.
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ment will probably never scrutinize, much less use, most of the
data in order to detect money laundering. A more effective ap-
proach to inhibiting the movement of illegal-source money would
be to encourage banks to know their customers, to provide banks
with profiles of potentially suspicious transactions so that banks
can alert the government to such activity, and to combine these
policies with the use of undercover investigations and informants'
tips, in order to unearth money laundering operations. The gov-
ernment should limit mandatory recordkeeping of wire and elec-
tronic. funds transfers, so that banks do not have to maintain
records that will be of little or no use to law enforcement. The
government should not yield to the temptation to require routine
reporting, as well as recording, of international wire and electron-
ic funds transfers. Routine reporting has proven ineffective in the
currency transaction context; applying it to wire and electronic
transfers would be to persist in a law enforcement tactic that has
proven ineffective, and to ask that private financial institutions,
and their customers, subsidize most of the tactic's tremendous
costs.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the money laun-
dering problem and law enforcement officials' concerns about it.
Part II describes a recently uncovered money laundering opera-
tion that operated for three years despite its compliance with
reporting regulations that aim to prevent and detect money laun-
dering. Part III outlines the current regulatory scheme. Part IV
examines the Treasury Department's recent proposals to impose
blanket recording, and possibly reporting, requirements on trans-
actions conducted with wire transfers. These proposed require-
ments are similar to those that currently apply to cash and cur-
rency transactions. Part V concludes that the government should
limit such recordkeeping requirements, and resist the temptation
to require routine reporting of wire and electronic funds trans-
fers.
I. THE MONEY LAUNDERING PROBLEM
Activities such as drug trafficking, gambling, extortion, brib-
ery, loansharking and prostitution generate large amounts of
cash." Cash has two virtues, from the criminal's point of view. It
11 Commentators have noted the irony of the fact that while checking accounts and
credit cards have replaced cash as the preferred medium of payment in most American
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is a readily acceptable medium of exchange in illegal dealings,
and it is difficult to trace. But it also has less desirable attributes.
Illegal-source cash can be difficult to handle due to its sheer phys-
ical volume, particularly with large amounts of cash in small de-
nominations. In addition, criminals need to use their funds with-
out attracting suspicion as to their source. This is why "launder-
ing" illegally generated cash is so important to the success of
large-scale criminal enterprises.
Criminal organizations accomplish much of their "laundering"
through financial institutions." Actual money laundering tech-
niques can be very simple, such as exchanging cash for cashier's
checks, or very complex."3 Those wanting to launder money of-
ten employ financial transactions that are no different from trans-
consumer transactions, cash has assumed an ever-greater importance as the medium of
exchange in illegal transactions, such as drug dealing. See, e.g., Rusch, Hue and Csy in the
Counting House: Some Observations on the Bank Secrecy Act, 37 CATH. U. L REv. 465
(1988). For example, in the period from 1984 to 1986, around 89% of the total $177.4
billion of coin and currency in circulation outside banks was "apparently held in unre-
ported hoards, 'underground' for illegal purposes, or offshore." Changes in the Use of
Transaction Accounts and Cash from 1984 to 1986, 73 FED. RES. BULL. 179, 191 (1987).
There is no consensus estimate of the amount of money involved in drug traffick-
ing in the United States. David Wilson, the chief of the financial operations section of
the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has observed:
It's like those black holes the astronomers tell us about. They don't emit any
light, so the astronomers presume they exist because of the way the celestial
bodies around them react. We look at the money in the drug business in much
the same way. We know it's out there, and we know it's quite big, but how big
is it? It doesn't really emit a whole lot of light, so we don't really know.
Cook, The Paradox of Antidrug Enforcement, FORBES, Nov. 13, 1989, at 105, 106. Even dif-
ferent government agencies arrive at different figures, ranging from $25 billion per year
to $110 billion per year. Id.
12 Launderers often use financial institutions that have their headquarters or branch-
es in foreign jurisdictions. They choose particular foreign jurisdictions on the basis of
their bank secrecy laws. These laws typically favor the privacy of the account owner over
the law enforcement interest of other sovereignties that try to obtain access to banking
records. The convenience of "offshore" banking is enhanced by the fact that many juris-
dictions allow funds to be held in the currency of the deposit-holder's choice. See gen-
era/y E. CHAMBOST, BANK ACcOUNTS: A WORLD GUIDE To CONFIDENTIALITY (1983).
For further discussion of foreign bank secrecy laws and the United States' attempts
to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over funds held abroad, see Harfield & Deming,
Extraterritorial Imperatives, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L 393 (1988); O'Donnell, The Secrets
of Foreign Bankers and the Federal Investigation: Tottering Balances, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 509 (1988); Note, Court-ordered Violations of Foreign Bank Secrecy and Blocking Laws:
Solving the Extraterritorial Dilemma, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 563; Note, ExtraterritorialJurisdic-
tion and International Banking. A Conflict of Interests, 43 U. MIAMi L. REV. 449 (1988). For
an example of a non-American perspective on the extraterritoriality problem, see
Ellinger, Extraterritorial Aspects of Bank Secrecy, 1985 J. BUs.L (England) 439.
13 See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. See also infra note 98.
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actions associated with legitimate commercial or personal financial
activity.14 What makes particular transactions unlawful is the ille-
gal source of the cash, and the motive to conceal the illegal
source or the true ownership of the funds.15 Thus, to identify
what is in fact a money laundering operation, one must associate
the funds involved, or the person controlling, depositing, or
transferring those funds, with some particular illegal activity. The
statutory and regulatory scheme that targets money laundering
aims to alert law enforcement agencies 16 to suspicious transac-
tions that may form a part of this illegal activity. But, despite this
web of regulations, drug traffickers and others are still laundering
illegal-source cash.'
II. LA MINA: REPORTING THE CASH AND LAUNDERING IT Too
The current regulatory attempts to prevent money laundering
leave wide gaps in which imaginative money launderers can oper-
ate. Their options include evasive structuring of transactions,
18
bribing a bank teller or bank official, so that no reports are ever
filed;19 getting an exemption from the reporting requirement, as
14 Such transactions include purchasing cashier's checks or traveler's checks, or con-
ducting wire transfers between ostensibly legitimate businesses that are actually "fronts"
for criminal organizations.
15 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988). Section 1956 creates two substantive offenses. One is
conducting financial transactions involving illegally generated funds, with the intent to
promote "specified unlawful activity," or with the intent to evade certain Internal Reve-
nue Code provisions; or knowing that the transaction is designed to conceal the source,
nature, ownership or location of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1956(a)(1). The second offense is transporting or transferring monetary instruments or
funds into, out of, or through the United States with such intent or knowledge. 18
U.S.C.A. § 1956(a)(2). In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 1957 prohibits engaging in monetary
transactions in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000. See Plombeck,
Confidentiality and Disclosure: The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and Banking Secre-
cy, 22 INT'L LAW. 69 (1988) for an analysis of these statutes, including their scienter
requirements.
16 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(e) and 1957(e), the statutes that define money laundering as a
substantive crime, provide that the Justice Department, the Department of the Treasury,
and, to the extent that it has jurisdiction, the Postal Service, may investigate money laun-
dering violations. The Treasury Department has jurisdiction and enforcement authority
over the currency and transaction reporting rules, which it promulgates under the au-
thority of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5314, 5316-5322 (1988).
17 See infra notes 21 and 22.
18 See infra notes 85-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of evasive structur-
ing of transactions.
19 Eduardo Orozco, who laundered $151 million in drug cash through New York fi-
nancial institutions over a four-year period, made use of a Citibank "insider" in this way.
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the regulations themselves allow;20 or creating "shell" corpora-
tions, or other fictitious entities to receive transfers of cash depos-
its.21 If the launderer uses this last technique, even if the finan-
cial institution that initially handles the cash files a currency trans-
action report (GTR) covering the transaction, the report will not
yield any information useful to the authorities.
22
The "La Mina" money laundering operation provides an ex-
ample of how money launderers can comply with all the reporting
requirements and still carry on their business unimpeded.2 The
federal government began unraveling La Mina's operation in
1988, in an investigation dubbed "Operation Polar Cap." The
Colombian drug traffickers whose profits La Mina ("the mine")
laundered had named their operation aptly. Over the course of its
three-year operation, from 1986 to 1989, La Mina laundered over
$1.2 billion for leaders of the Medellin cocaine cartel. One federal
investigator commented: "It was an amazing operation. It taught
me a whole lot I never knew about how money moves, how the
world really works. La Mina literally dragged me into the 20th
century."
24
La Mina operated in the Los Angeles jewelry district. Two
"front" firms located there, Ropex, and Andonian Brothers, took
in cash from street-level narcotics sales in New York, Miami,
Houston, Phoenix, and Los Angeles. 'Jewelry stores" in these
cities shipped the cash to Ropex and Andonian Brothers, via com-
mercial and armored couriers, in boxes marked "gold scrap."
Ropex and Andonian Brothers, which posed as gold dealers, then
deposited the cash into accounts they each had established at
local banks. From there, they wired the funds to Manhattan
banks. From Manhattan, they wired the funds to Panama, and
The "insider" was actually an undercover DEA agent investigating Orozco's financial af-
fairs. After Orozco was arrested and convicted in 1983 for conspiracy, the President's
Commission on Organized Crime featured details of Orozco's money laundering opera-
tion in its 1984 Report. THE CASH CONNECTION, sup= note 1, at 35-39. Testimony on
Orozco's money laundering operation is also featured prominently in the Commission's
March 14, 1984 Hearings on the money laundering problem. This testimony took up
seventy pages of the 189-page record. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED
CRIME, RECORD OF HEARING: ORGANIZED CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING 71-142 (1984).
20 See 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.22(b)(2), 103.26(3) (1990). See also infra text accompanying
notes 73-74.
21 See, e.g., Beaty & Hornik, A Torrent of Dirty Dollan TIME, Dec. 18, 1989, at 50.
22 Id. See also, Maxwell, Gold, Drugs and Clean Cash, LA. Times, Feb. 18, 1990,
(Magazine), at 10.
23 See generally Id.
24 Id. at 12.
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eventually to, South America. There, cartel leaders used some of
the money to pay for raw materials of the drug trade, and wired
the rest to European bank accounts.25
Thus, where the cash initially entered the domestic banking
system, it did so in the form of deposits by ostensibly legitimate
businesses. Ropex and Andonian Brothers told bankers that the
cash they deposited represented the profits from the sale of gold
to investors and jewelry makers." Their explanation for conduct-
ing their business in cash rather than in bank checks was that
they wanted to avoid being hurt by sudden swings in spot-market
precious metals prices.2 The GTRs that Ropex and Andonian
Brothers filed reflected their false identity as gold dealers, and
their false version of the source of the cash.
Thus, it was not information gleaned from CTRs that alerted
federal law enforcement authorities to the possibility of illegal
activity. Instead, the FBI and IRS received information about sus-
picious activity from an employee of an armored courier compa-
ny,28 and from the senior vice-president of Wells Fargo Bank in
Los Angeles, where Andonian Brothers opened an account.
Andonian Brothers' deposits reached $25 million in the first three
months their account was open, in early 1988. The Wells Fargo
Bank officer thought this was unusual even for an international
gold brokerage, ordered an internal investigation, and eventually
notified the IRS.2' Had it not been for these tips, which both
came from individuals close to the "ground floor" of La Mina's
laundering operation, La Mina might still be doing business.
3 0
25 An alternative technique was to ship gold-coated bars of lead from Uruguay, to
businesses in the United States that posed as refineries. Then, drug money from the
United States was wire transferred to Uruguay, ostensibly as "payment" for the gold. Id.
at 16-17.
26 I& at 12. Of course, other "covers" for would-be launderers are available.
Eduardo Orozco posed as a coffee broker; he also opened an account in the name of
"Calypso Travel Agency." See supra note 19; see also THE CASH CONNECrION, supra note
1, at 36, 38.
27 Maxwell, supra note 22, at 16.
28 Id. at 10. An employee of Loomis Armored Transport Co. noticed a tear in a
box that was part of a nightly shipment from a United Parcel Service aircraft. Shipping
documents said the box contained "gold scrap," being shipped from a New York jewelry
store to a Los Angeles gold dealer, Ropex. But the courier company employee could see
stacks of currency through the tear in the box, and gave this information to the FBI.
29 Id. at 12. See also Leven, Wells Pioneers Detection System, AMERICAN BANKER, July
24, 1989, at 17.
30 A DEA investigation that was underway in Atlanta at the time the government
received the tips from Los Angeles eventually pointed to La Mina, as well, but there was
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Some Los Angeles banks, like Wells Fargo, became suspicious of
the Ropex and Andonian Brothers explanations of the source of
their cash, and refused to handle it, but other banks accepted the
deposits."1 Since these deposits totaled hundreds of millions of
dollars, the banks' economic incentive to accept them was consid-
erable.
Although the La Mina operation was unusual in its scale
3 2
and in the wide publicity it received after being uncovered,3 it
had characteristics in common with other large money laundering
operations. A key similarity was the use of electronic and wire
transfers to move the cash after its initial deposit in Wells Fargo
and other domestic banks. The speed 4 and relative anonymity
5
of electronic transfers make them very attractive to money laun-
derers.
Of course, this speed and convenience are also important to
legitimate businesses, especially those that operate internationally.
The volume and dollar amounts of wire transfers that banks and
bank clearinghouses in the United States handle each day are tre-
no indication of the connection between the Atlanta investigation and the Los Angeles
money laundering operation at the time the FBI and IRS received the tips about Ropex
and Andonian Brothers. See Maxwell, supra note 22, at 14.
31 Even Justice Department prosecutors who were working with the Operation Polar
Cap task force reportedly believed that the spot market explanation was sufficiently plau-
sible "on the surface" to raise "reasonable doubt" in a courtroom, leading to the
launderers' acquittal. In order to gather money laundering evidence, agents began to
"track" the Ropex and Andonian Brothers cash by checking bank records of electronic
wire transfers. Id. at 16.
32 Richard Lind, then chief of money laundering investigations for the FBI, said La
Mina was "the biggest laundering operation we've ever seen." Id. at 12.
33 See, e.g., Beaty & Hornik, supra note 21; Maxwell, supra note 22.
34 Once funds are deposited in a bank, they can be transferred across the world in
seconds. Chase Manhattan Bank, which handles about 55,000 financial network messages
per day in New York, guarantees execution of all certified telexes one hour after recep-
tion. The one-hour period gives Chase's employees the time they may need to check the
financial message with the originating financial institution, and to ask for any necessary
confirmations. See D. Chorafas, supra note 9, at 115.
At one time during its operation, La Mina exported $28 million in a forty-five day
period. One of La Mina's leaders bragged to an undercover agent that La Mina could
deliver laundered cash from the United States to Panama in forty-eight hours. Maxwell,
supra note 22, at 14.
35 A bank customer can instruct her home computer to tell her bank's computer to
take money out of her account and send it to another account in a foreign bank. The
bank computer then tells a bank clearinghouse to send the customer's money to the ac-
count abroad. No person ever talks to another in most of these foreign transactions.
Labaton, Banking's Technology Helps Drug Dealers Export Cash.. . N.Y. Times, Aug. 14,
1989, at Al, col. 1. Banking through computer and telephone lines will likely become
increasingly prevalent. See D. Chorafas, supra note 9, at 141-43.
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mendous. Most of these wire transfers represent legitimate busi-
ness transactions.
3 6
The volume and speed of wire transfers not only make mov-
ing money from bank to bank, domestically or internationally,
easy, it also makes tracing these funds very difficult. This realiza-
tion has led to calls for yet more record-keeping and reporting
laws, to apply to wire or electronic funds transfers. Such new laws
would add to an already complex and burdensome array of regu-
lations.
III. THE CURRENT MANDATORY REPORTING SCHEME
The centerpiece of the current law is a set of transaction
reporting requirements. These requirements collectively comprise
the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act," more
frequently referred to as the Bank Secrecy Act, or BSA. Regula-
tions under the BSA 8 cover transactions in, and transportation
of, large amounts of currency. Additional "targeted" regulations
under the BSA cover transactions with foreign financial institu-
tions, or transactions that take place in a specified geographic
area of the United States."9 A further set of reporting regula-
tions applies to the purchase of instruments such as bank checks
36 An officer of Citibank in New York is quoted as saying that her bank handles
40,000 wire transfers each day, and the average transfer totals $3 million. She states that
the "vast majority" of these wire transfers represent legitimate transactions. Isikoff, Trea-
suty Weighs Banking Rule to Track Drug Profits Abroad, Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1989, at A6,
col. 1.
More than $1 trillion per day moves through bank clearinghouses in the United
States. The average transfer is $5 million. Labaton, Treasuy Offers Proposals Aimed at Drug
Laundering N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1989, D1, col. 1. The president and chief executive
officer of the New York Clearinghouse, which moves an average of about $700 million
each day through its computer system, notes that about 83% of the clearinghouse's cus-
tomers have a "regular relationship" with their banks. Id. Such a "regular relationship" is
regarded as an indication that the customer's business is legitimate.
One major bank's comments illustrate the banks,' and in turn their customers,' reli-
ance on efficient electronic funds transfers. The bank stated that if the financial
network's equipment is out of order for just one day, the interest lost on the accounts
at one regional processing center amounts to $50,000. See D. Chorafas, supra note 9, at
115.
37 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5314, 5316-5322 (1988). For a citation to the current ver-
sion of the Bank Secrecy Act in its entirety, see supra note 5.
38 31 C.F.R. § 103 (1990).
39 31 C.F.R. § 103.25 (1990) permits the Secretary of the Treasury to require re-
ports on transactions with foreign financial agencies; 31 C.F.R. § 103.26 (1990) permits
geographic targeting. See infra notes 50-70 and accompanying text for discussion of the
targeting regulations.
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or traveler's checks."0
All these regulations require detailed information on each
covered transaction. Penalties for non-compliance with the report-
ing requirements are stiff. Evidence indicates that the government
can hardly keep up with the large number of reports banks file in
compliance with the regulations. Yet, large-scale money laundering
operations like La Mina still operate successfully, for long periods
of time, even when they comply with the reporting regulations.
A. Currency Transactions and Transportation of Currency
Currency transaction regulations require that financial institu-
tions41 file reports on currency transactions42 of amounts over
$1 0 , 0 00_4S Financial institutions must file these currency transac-
40 31 C.F.R. § 103.29 (1990).
41 The regulations define "financial institution:"
(i) Financial institution. Each agent, agency, branch, or office within the United
States of any person doing business, whether or not on a regular basis or as an
organized business concern, in one or more of the capacities listed below:
(1) A bank (except bank credit card systems);
(2) A broker or dealer in securities;
(3) A currency dealer or exchanger, including a person engaged in the
business of a check casher;
(4) An issuer, seller, or redeemer of traveler's checks or money orders,
except as a selling agent exclusively who does not sell more than $150,000 of
such instruments within any given 30-day period;
(5) A licensed transmitter of funds, or other person engaged in the busi-
ness of transmitting funds;
(6) A telegraph company;
(7)(i) A casino or gambling casino licensed as a casino or gambling casino
by a State or local government and having gross annual gaming revenue in ex-
cess of $1,000,000.
(ii) A casino or gambling casino includes the principal headquarters and
any branch or place of business of the casino or gambling casino.
(8) A person subject to supervision by any state or federal bank superviso-
ry authority;
(9) The United States Postal Service with respect to the sale of money or-
ders.
31 C.F.R. § 103.11(i) (1990).
42 A "transaction in currency" is defined as:
A transaction involving the physical transfer of currency from one person to
another. A transaction which is a transfer of funds by means of bank check,
bank draft, wire transfer, or other written order, and which does not include
the physical transfer of currency is not a transaction in currency within the
meaning of this part.
31 C.F.P. § 103.11(r) (1990).
43 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1) (1990). Casinos must also report deposits, withdrawals,
exchanges of currency, gambling tokens or chips, or other transfers "by, through, or to"
[Vol. 66:867
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tion reports with the IRS." The financial institutions must pro-
vide the identity and the occupation of the individual who con-
ducted the transaction with the financial institution, the identity
of the individual on whose behalf the transactions were conduct-
ed, the "customer's account number affected by the transaction,"
and a description of the transaction. 5 The GTR also requires
information about the particular financial institution where the transac-
tion took place.
46
Additional Treasury regulations under the BSA scheme pro-
vide that a person who physically transports, mails, or ships 47 cur-
rency in an aggregate amount exceeding $10,000 at one time,48
into or out of the United States, must report details of this con-
duct to the IRS. 4 Such a report is a "Report of International
the casino, where a currency transaction of more than $10,000 is involved. 31 C.F.R. §
103.22(a)(2) (1990).
44 The CTR is submitted as IRS Form 4789. The IRS Data Center in Detroit pro-
cesses the forms, which banks must file within fifteen days following the reportable trans-
action. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.27 (1990). For a facsimile of the Form 4789, including its
instructions, see Welling, Smutfs, Money Laundering and the Federal Criminal Law: The
Crime of Structuring Transactions, 41 U. FLA. L REv. 287, 340-43 (1989).
45 Part IV of the CTR form requires details of the type of transaction for which
the form is being filed. The filing institution must specify whether the transaction was a
currency exchange (cash for cash); a deposit or withdrawal; a security purchase or re-
demption; a check purchase or check cashing; a CD or money market purchase or re-
demption; a wire transfer; or whether there had been a receipt of cash from abroad, or
a shipment abroad. In addition, the form calls for the total dollar amount of the
transaction; the amount that was in "$100 bills or higher;" the date of the transaction;
and the currency and country name if other than United States currency was involved.
The reporting regulations apply to foreign currency, as well as United States dollars. See
31 C.F.R. §§ 103.11(e) and 103.41 (1990). If a check or a wire transfer was involved, the
filing institution must list the date of the check or wire transfer; its amount; the payee;
the drawer, in the case of a check, and the drawee bank.
46 The financial institution where the currency transaction took place must record
the institution's "type," for example, bank, securities dealer, savings and loan, or "other."
The institution must also record its name and address; and the name, title and signature
of the preparer of the form, as well as the signature of the institution's "approving of-
ficial." See Welling supra note 44, at 340-43.
47 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 (1990), and 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1988) also apply to a person
who "causes" such shipment. 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 specifies that a "person is deemed to
have caused such transportation, mailing, or shipping when he aids, abets, counsels, com-
mands, procures, or requests it to be done by a financial institution or any other per-
son." 31 C.F.R. § 103.23(a) (1990).
48 For purposes of 31 C.F.R. § 103.23, if a person "either alone, in conjunction
with or on behalf of others" transports currency totaling more than $10,000 into or out
of the United States "on one calendar day, or if for the purpose of evading the report-
ing requirements of § 103.23, on one or more days," such transportation is deemed to
have been done "at one time." 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(a) (1990).
49 For entities and persons exempted from this reporting requirement, see 31
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Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments" (CMIR).
B. Targeting Regulations
More flexible "targeting" regulations allow the Secretary of
the Treasury to require additional, or more detailed, reports from
particular areas of Treasury concern. One of these targeting regu-
lations allows the Treasury Department to call for reports on cer-
tain transactions with foreign financial institutions. 50 The other
targeting regulation51 permits the Secretary to require reports of
transactions conducted with domestic financial institutions that are
located in a particular geographic area.52 Both of these regula-
tions give the Secretary of the Treasury broad discretion to speci-
fy exactly what financial institutions must do to comply with a
particular targeted regulation.
1. Transactions with Foreign Financial Agencies
The "foreign financial agencies" provision permits the Trea-
sury, whenever the Secretary "deems appropriate," to order do-
mestic financial institutions to file reports on transactions with for-
eign financial agencies." The Secretary can prohibit the disclo-
sure of "the existence or provisions of that reporting requirement
to the designated foreign financial agency ... and to any other
party."54 The Secretary can define the scope of the reports re-
C.F.R. § 103.23(c) (1990).
50 31 C.F.R. § 103.25 (1990). This regulation lists seven categories of transactions
that the Secretary of the Treasury may require specified financial institutions to report.
The seven categories are: checks or drafts, including traveler's checks; wire or electronic
fund transfers; loans to or through a foreign financial agency; commercial paper received
or shipped by the financial institution; stocks received or shipped; bonds received or
shipped; and certificates of deposit received or shipped. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.25(b) (1990).
51 31 C.F.R. 103.26 (1990); 31 U.S.C. § 5326 (1988).
52 "Geographic area" is broadly defined to mean
any area in one or more States of the United States, the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, the territories and possessions of the United
States, and/or political subdivision or subdivisions thereof.
31 C.F.R. § 103.26(d)(4) (1990).
53 31 C.F.R. § 103.25(a) (1990).
54 1i Paragraph 103.25(a) of the targeting regulation also gives the Secretary of the
Treasury two alternative means of promulgating a targeted regulation. The first means is
to provide both notice of the new targeted requirement and opportunity for public com-
ment on it. The alternative is to issue the new requirement as a final rule and to in-
clude with the new rule a finding of good cause for dispensing with notice and com-
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quired under this regulation, as well. The Secretary's judgments
determine which domestic financial institutions must comply with
the particular "targeted" reporting requirement; which foreign
countries the reporting requirement will encompass; what type of
transactions it will cover, or, alternatively, exempt; and the dollar
amounts to which the reporting requirement will apply.55 The
Secretary can also require information on transactions that oc-
curred prior to promulgation of the targeted requirement.56
The regulation places some generalized limitations on the
Secretary's discretion to order these targeted reports.57 It states
that, when issuing reporting orders, the Secretary "shall consider"
the need to avoid impeding the import or export of monetary in-
struments, and the need to avoid unreasonably burdening a per-
son making a transaction with a foreign financial agency.58 The
regulation also prohibits the Secretary from issuing a targeted
regulation in order to obtain individually identifiable account
information, under specified circumstances.59
2. Geographic Targeting
The "geographic targeting" regulation, 31 C.F.R. § 103.26,
allows the Secretary similar discretion to define the terms of any
order that the Secretary issues under this regulation's authority.60
There are differences between sections 103.25 and 103.26, howev-
ment. This paragraph also provides that in cases where the Secretary gives actual notice
of the new targeted regulation to the domestic financial institution involved, rather than
following the normal course of giving notice by publishing the regulation in the Federal
Register, the Secretary may prohibit disclosure of "the exdstence or provisions of that
reporting requirement to the designated foreign financial agency or agencies and to any
other party." Id.
55 31 C.F.R. § 103.25(c) (1990).
56 31 C.F.R. § 103.25(e)(3) (1990). The Secretary can require only reports of infor-
mation that the financial institution already was obliged to maintain pursuant to
Treasury regulations, state or federal law, or information that the institution maintained
in the regular course of business.
57 31 C.F.R. § 103.25(e) (1990).
58 Id.
59 Id. This prohibition applies to situations Where the customer "is already the sub-
ject of an ongoing investigation for possible violation of the Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act, [the BSA] or is known by the Secretary to be the subject of
an investigation for possible violation of other federal law." Id.
60 31 C.F.R. § 103.26 (1990). In addition to the dollar amount and "type" of trans-
action to which the targeted order will apply, the Secretary must specify the starting and
ending dates by which transactions will be reported, how long the financial institution
must keep the reports, and "any other information deemed necessary to carry out the
purposes of the order." 31 C.F.R. § 103.26(c) (1990).
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er. The text of section 103.26 seems to demand a higher level of
justification for geographic targeting than the "deems appropriate"
standard that section 103.25 applies to the targeting of "foreign
financial agencies." To order targeted reporting under section
103.26, the Secretary must find that "reasonable grounds"61 exist
for the conclusion that the additional targeted reporting is "neces-
sary" to carry out the purposes62 of the reporting provisions and
to "prevent persons from evading the [regulations']
recordkeeping/reporting provisions."63
Section 103.26 itself does not explicitly define "reasonable
grounds." Nonetheless, reasonable grounds would likely include
reports of large surpluses of cash by the Federal Reserve Bank
serving a particular geographic area;64 informants' tips on the exis-
tence of a money laundering operation in a given locality;6" or
other evidence of large-scale drug trafficking or other illegal, cash-
generating activity that creates a demand for money laundering
services in a particular area.
61 See 31 C.F.R. § 103.26(a) (1990).
62 31 C.F.R. § 103, which sets out the BSA regulations, does not include a specific
statement of its "purposes." Yet, Subpart B of the regulation, which contains the individ-
ual sections on "Reports to be Made," including § 103.26, contains the following declara-
tion: "The Secretary hereby determines that the reports required by this subpart have a
high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings."
31 C.F.R. § 103.21 (1990). Thus, the terms "necessary" and "purposes" in § 103.26
would probably be interpreted in light of the "determinations" set out in § 103.21.
63 31 C.F.R. § 103.26(a) (1990).
64 Law enforcement officials indicate that cash surpluses at a particular Federal Re-
serve Bank often indicate money laundering activity at financial institutions served by
that Federal Reserve Bank. In recent years, these cash surpluses in major cities have
reached enormous levels. For example, in 1985 the Federal Reserve's Los Angeles office
received $165.8 million more than it shipped to the banks it served in Southern Califor-
nia, Arizona, and part of Nevada. In 1987, its surplus was $2.5 billion. A similar phe-
nomenon in Miami indicates that that city remains a money laundering center. For 1987,
the Federal Reserve Bank serving the Miami area had a cash surplus of $5.2 billion.
Frantz, IRS Subpoenas Records of Calfornia Banks in Broad Money-Laundering Probe, LA.
Times, Oct. 4, 1988, at DI, col. 4. Cash surpluses reported by Federal Reserve Banks in
the area along the Texas-Mexico border rank third, behind those reported by Federal
Reserve Banks in Miami and Los Angeles. Cash pours into the Federal Reserve Bank in
San Antonio from "casas de cambio" (currency exchanges) and banks along the border.
In the first ten months of 1989, this surplus had reached $2.3 billion. A 1988 report
showed that nearly 90% of a $1.6 billion cash surplus came from banks within fifteen
miles of the border. Those banks dealt extensively with currency-exchange-type businesses
in the area. See Weingarten, Drug Cash Flows Over U.S. Border, Chicago Trib., Dec. 10,
1989, § 1, at 25, col 1.
65 See, e.g., United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1986).
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3. Overall Flexibility of the Targeting Regulations
Notwithstanding the generalized limitations noted above,66
the targeting regulations, sections 103.25 and 103.26, provide the
government with a flexible investigatory, and perhaps, deterrent
device for inhibiting money laundering operations. The govern-
ment can tailor the parameters of a reporting order to a particu-
lar geographic or foreign "target," and thereby gather information
that the routine reporting requirements miss.67 Since the gov-
ernment can vary the threshold dollar amount of reportable trans-
actions from order to order, it will be more difficult for would-be
money launderers to evade reporting. Prohibiting disclosure of
the existence of a particular targeted order, under section 103.25,
will also inhibit evasive structuring of transactions. 68 If money
launderers do not know precisely which of their transactions fi-
nancial institutions will record or report, they cannot easily design
schemes to defeat the regulations' law enforcement purposes.
The discretion to choose particular types of transactions for
reporting also means that the government can order reporting of
wire or electronic funds transfers (EFTs) from particular catego-
ries of financial institutions.69 This narrows a gap in the routine
currency transaction reporting requirements, which do not apply
to wire or electronic funds transfers. As this Note mentions, wire
and electronic funds transfers are a particular area of concern to
the government.70
66 31 C.F.R. § 103.26 (1990) and its authorizing statute, 31 U.S.C. § 5326 (1988),
also limit geographically targeted orders to a sixty-day coverage period. But the govern-
ment can renew the order after the expiration of the initial sixty-day period, presumably
upon a showing that "reasonable grounds" for the order still exist. 31 C.F.R. § 103.26
(d)(1) (1990). The only language in the relevant paragraph that indicates the conditions
upon which renewal will be granted is the statement that an order may be renewed
"pursuant to the requirements of paragraph (a)." Id. The text of § 103.26(a), in turn,
contains no specific language pertaining to renewal; it merely states that there should be
.reasonable grounds" for issuance of an order under this section.
67 See 31 C.F.RL § 103.22 (1990), which applies only to transactions that involve
$10,000 or more in currency.
68 For a discussion of "structuring," see infra notes 85-105 and accompanying text.
69 See 31 C.F.R. § 103.25(b)(2) (1990).
70 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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C. Bank Checks, Cashier's Checks, Money Orders, and Traveler's
Checks
The most recent addition to the government's reporting and
recordkeeping regime covers the purchases of bank checks and
drafts, cashier's checks, money orders, and traveler's checks.71
This regulation mandates that whenever a financial institution
issues or sells any of the instruments specified, for $3000 or more
in currency, the institution must record certain information, and
verify the identity of the purchaser.7 2
D. Exemptions from the Reporting Requirements of 31 C.F.R. § 103
(1990)
The regulatory scheme provides for exemptions from some of
its reporting requirements. Those who want to launder money,
under the guise of conducting a legitimate business that regularly
handles large amounts of currency, may try to get an exemption
from their bank, under section 103.22(b)(2). This section allows
banks to exempt deposits or withdrawals of currency "from an
existing account by an established depositor.""3 Banks do not
71 31 C.F.R. § 103.29 (1990); 31 U.S.C. § 5325 (1988). This regulation was effective
as of August 13, 1990.
72 31 C.F.R. § 103.29 requires the financial institution to keep a chronological log
of the covered transactions, for each calendar month. If the purchaser of a traveler's
check, for example, has an account with the financial institution, that institution must
record in its log the purchaser's name, account number, the date of purchase, the
branch where the purchase occurred, the serial number(s) of the instrument, and the
dollar amount of each of the instruments purchased in currency. 31 C.F.R. §
103.29(a)(1)(i) (1990).
In addition to the items listed above, if the purchaser does not have an account
with that financial institution, the institution must log the purchaser's social security
number or alien identification number; date of birth; the name, and social security num-
ber, or account number of the person on whose behalf the purchase is being made; and
the payee(s) on any instruments purchased. 31 C.F.R. § 103.29(a)(2)(i) (1990). The finan-
cial institution must verify the identity of both accountholders and nonaccountholders
who make these recordable purchases. 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.29(a)(1)(ii) and 103.29(a)(2)(ii)
(1990).
73 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(i) (1990). Banks may exempt transactions of a United
States resident who operates a retail business in the United States. For a retail business
to qualify for an exemption under this section, it must be a business that is paid in sub-
stantial amounts of currency. The section explicitly states that businesses that buy or sell
motor vehicles, vessels, or aircraft are not eligible for exemptions under this section. Id.
Banks may also exempt depositors who operate businesses such as race tracks, bars,
restaurants, hotels, licensed check cashing services, regularly scheduled passenger airlifies,
or any public utility. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(2)(ii) (1990).
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have carte blanche to exempt the transactions of whatever custom-
er they choose, however. The exempted transactions must be in
amounts that the banks may "reasonably conclude" do not exceed
amounts commensurate with the conduct of a lawful business of
the type the customer claims to represent.74
E. Volume of Routine Reporting
Currently, the IRS can hardly process the vast numbers of
GIRs that the reporting requirements have generated. 5 Prior to
1985, financial institutions filed only a few hundred thousand
CTRs each year.76 Then, in 1985, the Treasury Department
slapped the Bank of Boston with a $500,000 civil penalty for its
failure to file CTRs covering shipments of a total of $1.16 billion
in cash to banks in Switzerland and elsewhere in Europe.7 7 The
event received wide publicity.78 Filings of CTRs surged to '3.6
million the following year, 1986, and continue to increase. In the
first six months of 1990, financial institutions filed 4.2 million




The government provides financial institutions with ample
incentive to comply with the Treasury's reporting regulations. The
maximum civil penalty for a single violation of the regulations is
either $100,000, or the amount involved in the transaction, which-
74 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(c) (1990). In addition, as of October, 1986, the exempted cus-
tomer must prepare, and the bank must retain, a'statement describing the customary con-
duct of the customer's lawful business. See 31 C.F.1R § 103.22(d) (1990) for specific in-
formation the customer must provide. The bank must also keep a centralized list of
exemptions it has granted, and its reasons for granting them. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(f)
(1990).
The only other provision for exemptions in 31 C.F.R. § 103 (1990) applies to geo-
graphically targeted orders promulgated under § 103.26. See supra notes 60-65 and accom-
panying text. This provision states that a bank that receives a geographically targeted re-
porting order may continue to apply exemptions granted under § 103.22, but it may not
grant additional or new exemptions. 31 C.F.R. § 103.26(d)(3) (1990).
75 Iida, IRS' Kirby Braces to Fight Drugs With Electronic Data, AMERICAN BANKER, Oct.
19, 1990, at 2.
76 Gerhardstein, Reporting of Large Cash Transactions to IRS Surges Sharply, AMERICAN
BANKER, Aug. 27, 1990, at 8.
77 See Gartlett & Wallace, Money Laundering. Who's Involved, How It Works, and Where
It's Spreading, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 18, 1985, at 74, 76.
78 Id.
79 See supra note 76.
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ever is greater."0 If a bank violates the requirement to maintain
procedures for reporting, 31 U.S.C. § 5821 provides that "a sepa-
rate violation occurs for each day the violation continues and at
each office, branch, or place of business at which a violation oc-
curs or continues."" For a criminal violation of the reporting or
recordkeeping requirements, the stakes are even higher. Criminal
violation of any of the requirements can carry a fine of $250,000
and/or five years' imprisonment.8 2  Where the government
proves the elements of the defendants' underlying laundering
activities," in addition to proving the reporting violations, the
80 See 31 U.S.C. § 5321 (1988); 31 C.F.R. § 103.47 (1990).
81 31 U.S.C. § 5321 (1988).
82 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1988); 31 C.F.R. § 103.49 (1990). These penalties do not apply
to violations of 31 U.S.C. § 5315 (1988), which has its own penalty provisions. Section
5315 gives the Secretary of the Treasury authority to require reports on foreign currency
transactions conducted by United States persons.
83 31 U.S.C. § 5322(b) (1990) provides for increased criminal fines and prison terms
in instances where a person willfully violates the reporting and/or recording laws "while
violating another law of the United States or as part of a pattern of any illegal activity
involving more than $100,000 in a 12-month period." In prosecutions of banks for viola-
tions of BSA reporting requirements, two federal circuits have held that the "pattern of
illegal activity" that triggers the § 5322(b) felony enhancement provision does not have
to be activity independent of the reporting violations themselves. Thus, where a financial
institution violates the reporting requirements for transactions involving over $100,000 in
a twelve-month period, this series of violations can itself constitute a "pattern of illegal
activity." See United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987). Furthermore, a bank's failure to report any of its reportable
transactions can be sufficient to constitute a "pattern of illegal activity." United States v.
St. Michael's Credit Union, 880 F.2d 579, 587 (1st Cir. 1989).
In Bank of New England, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that
to form a "pattern under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act [the
BSA], the transactions must be "repeated and related." Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at
853. The court said that the government might prove, inter alia, a common feature
among the customers involved, among the forms of transfers of currency, and/or among
the purposes for which the funds were used. Id. In St. Michael's Credit Union, the First
Circuit affirmed the "repeated and related" standard it set out in Bank of New England,
but said that the government met this standard by showing that the defendant credit
union had filed no CTRs at all. St. Michael's Credit Union, 880 F.2d at 587. The court
stated: "The necessary connection [among the transactions] can be shown by proving
that the financial institution chronically and consistently failed to file any CTRs. By
showing a consistent failure to report, the government has proven an overall relationship
among the transactions. There is a pattern of not reporting." Id.
The penalty enhancement provision of § 5322(b) can also apply to an individual
who transports currency without complying with the reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C.
§ 5316. Thus, where the defendant, an officer of a Panamanian airline, INAIR, agreed
to transport multiple shipments of approximately $2 million in currency per week out of
the United States without reporting the shipments to the United States government, the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found a "pattern of illegal activity" that satis-




penalty can reach a $500,000 fine and/or ten years' imprison-
ment. The regulations also provide specific penalties for "structur-
ing" violations.
84
G. Evasive Structuring of Transactions
The very wording of the BSA's regulatory scheme suggests a
way to avoid the filing of CTRs for a particular transaction. The
"trigger" for the CTR requirement is a transaction involving an
amount of currency greater than $10,000. So persons who want
to conduct large currency transactions without having a report
filed simply break up the total amount of cash they wish to de-
posit or transfer into smaller components; that is, amounts of less
than $10,000. For instance, someone may make multiple purchas-
es of cashier's checks each for under $10,000, at different banks,
or at different branches of the same bank, on one day, thus con-
verting a large sum of currency into more portable and less con-
spicuous instruments.85
Law enforcement authorities refer to this technique as
"smurfing."86 Until Congress passed the Money Laundering Con-
trol Act (MLCA)87 in 1986, "smurfing" received inconsistent judi-
cial treatment.8 Some circuits held that breaking up transactions
to avoid the filing of reports did not violate the BSA reporting
requirements," while others held that it did.90 In United States
The Valdes-Guena court, and the Bank of New England and St. Michael's courts, cited
United States v. Dickinson, 706 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1983), as persuasive authority for their
interpretations of "pattern of illegal activity." The Dickinson court had reasoned that "pat-
tern of illegal activity" in former 31 U.S.C. § 1059, now 31 U.S.C. § 5322, must refer to
"repeated violations of the [Bank Secrecy] Act itself, related to each other, and together
totalling more than $100,000." Dickinson, 706 F.2d, at 91.
84 31 U.S.C. § 5322(b) (1988); 31 C.F.R. § 103.49(2) (1990). For a discussion of
"structuring" see infra notes 85-105 and accompanying text.
85 For a discussion of variations on the evasive structuring technique, see supra
Welling, note 44 at 296-97. See also, e.g., United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304 (11th
Cir. 1989).
86 See e.g., MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT July, 1989, at 12; see also Welling, supra note
44.
87 See supra note 7.
88 See Welling, supra note 44 at 295-96.
89 See e.g., United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v.
Varbel, 780 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1986).
90 See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 745 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1220 (1986); United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983) and
United States v. Thompson, 603 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1979).
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v. Tobon-Builes,"1 the defendants made a series of twenty-one pur-
chases of cashier's checks at different Florida banks, using a vari-
ety of names, including false names. Over the course of two days
in 1981, they divided a total of $185,200 in cash into increments
of under $10,000 for each cashier's check they pur-
chased-"smurfing." 2 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit upheld the defendants' convictions, based on 18 U.S.C. §
1001," which prohibits anyone from concealing a material fact
within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States.94 Tobon-Builes argued that, under the applicable regula-
tion, the financial institution, not the individual, has the legal
duty to disclose information to the government. But the court
reasoned that Tobon-Builes' liability stemmed from his causing
the financial institutions handling the transactions not to file the
reports.95 Courts of appeal in the Second and Tenth Circuits,
and a district court in the Fifth Circuit, applied similar reasoning
in concluding that individuals were criminally liable for structur-
ing their transactions to avoid the reporting requirements. 5
91 United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092.
92 Id. at 1092-96.
93 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). This section provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any
trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudu-
lent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or docu-
ment knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement
or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
94 Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d at 1096.
95 Id. at 1098-99. The Tobon.Builes court relied on the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in
United States v. Thompson, 603 F. 2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1979), in reaching this conclusion.
The Tobon-Builes court also emphasized that in Thompson, the defendant's liability
"stemmed not from his duty to file a currency report but rather from his causing the
financial institutions to fail to file a report." Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d at 1098 (citing Thomp-
son, 603 F.2d at 1201).
In addition, the Tobon-Builes court cited 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1988), which provides
that a person who "willfully causes an act to' be done which if directly performed by
him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a princi-
pal." Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d at 1099.
96 In United States v. Cook, 745 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1985), the defendant bungled
an attempt to transfer $90,000 in cash from one bank account to a new account in a
different bank, where he planned to use a false identity in establishing the account.
Cook withdrew the money from one account in increments of $9,900 or $9,999 without
having any CTRs filed with the IRS. When he sought to re-deposit the money at differ-
ent banks, bank officials became suspicious because of both the size of the deposit,
$90,000, and the fact that Cook could produce no driver's license supporting his false
identity. One of the banks where he temporarily deposited the cash filed a CTR, reflect-
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United States v. Varbel9" represented the contrary line of cas-
ing the false name and address Cook had given.
Eventually, when Cook re-deposited the $90,000 at yet another bank, using his real
name, he was indicted for, inter alia, violations of 31 U.S.C. § 5313, which requires rou-
tine reporting of currency transactions over $10,000, and its implementing regulations.
The Cook court rejected Cook's argument that since, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5313, an,
individual is under no duty to accurately file a CTR, Cook's misrepresenting his identity
on the CTR that the bank filed could not be a violation of § 5313. The Cook court
cited Thompson and Tobon-Builes. Cook, 745 F.2d at 1315. The court held that individuals
can violate § 5313 where they knowingly and willfully cause a financial institution to fail
to file an accurate CIR. Id. The Cook court, like the Tobon-Builes court, noted that 18
U.S.C. § 2(b) supported this holding. See supra note 95, for the application of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2(b) in the transaction reporting context.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also held that an indi-
vidual could be liable for causing a financial institution to fail to file a CTR. United
States v. Heyman, 794 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1986). The defendant in Heyman was an ac-
count executive at Merrill Lynch, who opened several joint and individual accounts for a
client in the client's name, and in the names of the client's relatives. Heyman received a
briefcase containing $70,000 in cash from the client. He then broke the $70,000 into
sub-$10,000 sums. Heyman deposited each of these smaller increments into the several
accounts he had opened for the client. The following day, Heyman instructed that all of
the money be transferred from these accounts into a single joint account Heyman had
established in the name of his client and the client's wife. The Heyman court agreed, as
the government had conceded, that Heyman himself did not have a legal duty to file
CTRs, in his capacity as an account executive at Merrill Lynch. Nevertheless, the court
held that application of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) made Heyman criminally liable for causing
Merrill Lynch to fail to file CTRs covering his client's transactions. Id. at 791-92. The
Heyman court distinguished cases such as United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758 (9th Cir.
1986). See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text. In Varbe4 the Ninth Circuit held
that the defendant's structuring his transactions did not violate the BSA's reporting re-
quirements. The Heyman court noted that in the Ninth Circuit case, the defendant had
conducted sub-$10,000 transactions at several different banks, none of which alone could
have violated the BSA by not filing a CTRL In contrast, Merrill Lynch would have been
required to file a CTR for cumulative deposits in a single day. Thus, it reasoned,
Heyman's actions caused Merrill Lynch to violate the Bank Secrecy Act (referring to the
Act by its official name, the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act). Heyman,
794 F.2d at 792.
In United States v. Sanchez-Vasquez, 585 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Ga. 1984), the defen-
dants argued that 31 C.F.R. § 103.11 defines each branch of a bank as a separate finan-
cial institution. Thus, they claimed, no single financial institution with whom they dealt
in their multiple purchases of cashier's checks at various branches of the same bank had
a duty to file a CTR, because each transaction at a particular bank branch involved an
amount less than $10,000. The court rejected this interpretation of the reporting laws.
The court said that the applicable statute, 31 U.S.C. § 5312, and the corresponding reg-
ulation, 31 C.F.R. § 103.11, must be read together in order to define "financial institu-
tion" correctly. The court found that "financial institution," correctly interpreted, meant
a bank, including each of its branches. Thus, a bank must file a CTR if there are multi-
ple transactions at its different branches, and the total of these transactions exceeds
$10,000. Sanchez-Vasquez 585 F. Supp. at 993. The Sanchez-Vasquez court then cited Tobon-
Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983), without further elaboration, in holding that the
defendants could be liable under the BSA for their evasive structuring of transactions.
97 United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758 (9th Cir 1986). See also Money Dealings
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es. Varbel stemmed from an FBI sting operation in which a gov-
ernment informant and an undercover FBI agent posed as co-
caine dealers seeking to launder narcotics proceeds. The FBI re-
ceived information that a Phoenix attorney, Duane Varbel, was launder-
ing money. Varbel set up a complex scheme"8 to launder "co-
caine cash" for his "clients." The purported clients were actually
undercover agents. One step in Varbel's plan was to purchase
cashier's checks at various California banks, each in an amount
under $10,000. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed Varbel's convictions for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 9
The court held that because Varbel had no legal duty to inform
the banks with whom he dealt of the nature of his currency trans-
actions,1"' he could not be guilty of a concealment violation un-
der § 1001. The court also said Varbel had not aided or abetted
anyone in the commission of a crime, and thus he also had not
violated 18 U.S.C. § 2.101 The Varbel court commented: "If Con-
gress or the Secretary wish to impose a reporting duty on finan-
cial institution customers, they must do so in clear, unambiguous
language. We cannot impose the duty by implication."
0 2
Congress responded to this challenge. The current version of
the reporting statute explicitly makes it a crime to "structure"
transactions in order to evade the reporting requirement of 31
U.S.C. § 5313 (a).' 03 The reporting statute provides that no per-
Ruled Not Illegal Laundering, LA. Times, Feb. 11, 1986, at B3, col. 4.
98 Varbel's plan to handle his client's "drug money" included physically transporting
cash out of the United States to the Cayman Islands, and then forming a Caymanian
corporation, called Anderex. Anderex, an offshore investment company, then opened an
account at Intercontinental Bank in the Cayman Islands. Next, Varbel's laundering associ-
ates in the United States took $50,000 of what they believed to be "drug cash" to vari-
ous banks around Irvine, California and purchased cashier's checks there, in amounts
less than $10,000, but totaling $50,000. The checks would eventually be transferred to
the Anderex account in the Cayman Islands. From there, the funds would be returned
to the "drug dealer" in the form of a bank loan. Varbel, 780 F.2d at 759.
99 As in Tobon-Builes, the government charged the defendant with a "concealment
violation" under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). See supra notes 93-95.
100 Varbel, 780 F.2d at 762. The court also emphasized that only financial institutions
had a duty to file reports.
101 Id The court stated that the banks themselves had committed no crime in failing
to file the CTRs, because there was no evidence in the record that the banks had
knowledge of the manner in which the cashier's checks involved were purchased. There-
fore, Varbel could not be liable for aiding or abetting them in commission of a crime
under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). See supra note 95 for the pertinent language of § 2.
102 Varbel, 780 F.2d at 762-63.
103 See 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1988); 31 C.F.R. § 103.53 (1990). Additional amendments
Congress made to the Money Laundering Control Act in 1988 also make evasive
structuring more difficult. These additions, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5325-5326, require banks to
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son shall "structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to struc-
ture or assist in structuring, any ,transaction with one or more
domestic financial institutions." 104 This provision widely expands
the criminal liability of would-be money launderers.10 5 In partic-
ular, it settles the question of whether criminal liability attaches to
evasive conduct, where the bank customer uses several different
banks in the course of breaking a large sum of cash into amounts
of less than $10,000. Would-be smurfs must find more imaginative
techniques to thwart the provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act and
the Money Laundering Control Act.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR BLANKET RECORDKEEPING OF
WIRE TRANSFERS
The Treasury Department has proposed new rules to amend
the current versions of 31 C.F.R. § 103.25, the foreign financfal
agencies targeting provision, and 31 C.F.R. § 103.33, which sets
out rules for mandatory recordkeeping, as distinguished from
reporting, by financial institutions. In addition, the Department
has proposed several changes to section 103.11, the recordkeeping
and reporting regulations' "definitions" section.' 6
The proposed amendments to section 103.25 would expand
the recordkeeping requirement under that regulation to include,
in the case of a bank,"0 7 all funds transfers, and in the case of
financial institutions other than a bank, all transmittals or receipts
of funds by the institution."°8 There would be an exception
from the recordkeeping requirement for domestic bank-to-bank trans-
verify the identity of persons who purchase certain instruments for over $3000 in cash,
and permit the Secretary of the Treasury to "target" particular types of institutions or
geographic areas for special reporting requirements. See supra notes 50-65 and accompa-
nying text. See also Welling, supra note 44, n.104 at 804.
104 31 U.S.G. § 5324(3) (1988).
105 Section 5824 has already survived a "vagueness" challenge at the district court
level. See United States v. Scanio, 705 F. Supp. 768 (W.D.N.Y. 1988). See also Welling,
supra note 44 at 323-24. Professor Welling notes that "structuring" had acquired a com-
mon law meaning before § 5324 was enacted.
106 See 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696 (1990) (proposed Oct. 15, 1990).
107 The current version of 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(b) (1990) defines "bank" to include,
inter alia, each agent, agency, branch, or office within the United States of any person
doing business as a commercial bank; a private bank; a savings and loan association; a
savings bank or other thrift institution; a credit union; and a bank organized under for-
eign law.
108 See 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696 at 41,700-01 (1990). For the text of the proposed regula-
tion, see id. at 41,704 (proposing the new rule to be codified at 31 C.F.R. §
103.33(0(1)(i)) (proposed Oct. 15 1990).
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fers, when these transfers are for the banks' own accounts.' °9
The current version of the general recordkeeping require-
ment, 31 C.F.R. § 103.33, requires financial institutions to keep a
"record" of the advice, instruction, or request for all international
funds transfers over $10,000.110 It does not specify what particu-
lar items of information the financial institution must record,
however. Inconsistent recording practices among financial institu-
tions, which in turn yielded incomplete information to the Trea-
sury Department, have made it difficult for the Department to effec-
tively use its targeting authority under section 103.25.11 The pro-
posed amendments to section 103.33112 specify particular items
of information the financial institutions must keep. The recorded
items must include the identity and account number of the origi-
nator of a payment order, the amount of the order, the date of
the transaction, the identity of the beneficiary's bank, the
beneficiary's account number, and the name of the person on
whose behalf the funds transfer was originated." 3 Originator
banks, beneficiary banks, and intermediary financial institutions
must keep records of these transactions.
Treasury's proposed changes to section 103.33 also specify
particular procedures financial institutions should follow in verify-
ing the identity of persons conducting the recordable transac-
tions." 4 A financial institution should take special care in con-
ducting transactions with persons who do not hold a deposit ac-
count at that particular institution."' Parallel recordkeeping and
identification verification requirements" 6 would apply to "non-
bank transmitters of funds," such as check cashers, all of which
come under the definition of "financial institutions," in the BSA
regulatory scheme." 7 The proposals do not give the nonbank
institutions an exemption from reporting funds transfers between
109 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696, at 41,704 (1990) (proposing the new rule to be codified at
31 C.F.R. § 103.33(e)(4) (proposed Oct. 15, 1990).
110 31 G.F.R. § 103.33(b)-(c) (1990).
111 Some banks systematically recorded information in great detail, while others kept
records haphazardly. See 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696 at 41,702 (1990).
112 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696 at 41,703-04 (1990) (proposing the new rule to be codified
at 31 C.F.R. § 103.33) (proposed Oct. 15, 1990).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See id. at 41,703 (proposing the new rule to be codified at 31 G.F.R. §
103.33(e)(1)(iii)(B)) (proposed Oct. 15, 1990).
116 See supra note 108.
11 See 31 C.F.R. § 103.11 (i) (1990), and supra note 41.
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themselves, for their own accounts, however.
Although this version of the Treasury Department's proposals
is less onerous than the previous set of proposals the Treasury
made in 1989,11' bankers have greeted it with alarm." 9 The
American Bankers' Association has estimated the annual cost of
compliance with these new wire transfer recording proposals at
$110 million. 2 ' The bankers have an obvious interest in keep-
ing such an estimate high. But the Treasury Department, too, has
published some of the government's own estimates of the burden
the wire transfer recording proposals will impose on domestic
financial institutions. The Department's estimate of the "total an-
nual reporting and recordkeeping burden" was 7.5 million
hours.1
2 '
This burden, whether expressed in dollars or work-hours,
arises partly from the fact that proposed regulations for reporting
on wire and electronic funds transfers do not include a monetary
threshold. No matter what the amount of the transfer, the finan-
cial institution(s) involved must record the specified informa-
tion.1 22 This may prevent the government from having to fight
the "structuring" battle12  all over again in the wire and elec-
tronic funds transfer context, but it means the financial institu-
tions must keep detailed records of many more transactions than
they now must report or record.
In the "Supplementary Information" that accompanied its
proposal,124 the Treasury Department refused to rule out the
possibility of requiring routine reporting of international funds
transfers. Yet, the same Treasury Department announcement con-
cedes that "in many situations, it is not apparent whether the
funds involved in a funds transfer are domestic or international in
origin."125 The Treasury Department has determined, however,
that "there is law enforcement value in having records of all trans-
118 See 54 Fed. Reg. 45,769 (1989).
119 See, e.g., Treasury Issues Wire Transfer Proposal as Bankes Blast Latest Industy Bur-
den, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 549 (Oct. 22, 1990).
120 Id.
121 The Treasury Department's official announcement of the proposed rules included
estimates of the recordkeeping burden the rules would impose on the affected financial
institutions. See 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696 at 41,702 (1990).
122 See 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696 (1990).
123 See supra notes 85-105 and accompanying text.
124 See 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696 at 41,697.
125 Id.
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fers."'26 Presumably, this statement stems from the idea that by
requiring financial institutions to keep records of all wire or elec-
tronic funds transfers, law enforcement authorities can ensure
that particular records will be available, should the need for these
records arise in the course of a particular investigation. The pro-
posed regulations, like all the recordkeeping regulations of 31
C.F.R. § 103, which implements the Bank Secrecy Act, require
that financial institutions keep records of a particular funds trans-
fer for at least five years after the transfer date. 27 The financial
institution must keep the records in a such a form that they are
retrievable by the financial institution customer's name, or ac-
count number.
28
Insofar as the object of the proposed regulations is to impose
uniformity on financial institutions' recordkeeping practices, the
regulations may prove valuable to law enforcement. Yet, major
banks already keep records of all wire and electronic funds trans-
fers that they handle. 29 In addition, the government would
probably be unable to make effective use of the recorded infor-
mation. As this Note has mentioned,3 0 the government already
has trouble processing the high volume of CTRs that financial
institutions now file, pursuant to current Treasury regulations.
Searching for the money laundering "needle" in the "haystack" of
records of all international wire and electronic funds transfers is
not likely to be an effective method of identifying money launder-
ing activity.
More promising is the suggestion, which the Treasury Depart-
ment mentioned in announcing the proposed new rules,13' that
it will require reporting only of "suspicious transfers," identified
according to a "suspicious transaction profile." 1 2 This approach
126 Id.
127 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696 at 41,703-04 (1990) (proposing the new rule to be codified
at 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.33(e)(1)(iii)(3) and 103.33(O(1)(i)(3)) (proposed Oct. 15, 1990).
128 Id.
129 For example, Citibank, N.A., Chemical Bank, Continental Bank, N.A., and Wells
Fargo Bank all keep records of the details of wire and electronic transfers. Telephone
interviews with wire transfer and electronic funds transfer department employees. (Mar.
14-15, 1991).
130 See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
131 See 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696 at 41,697 (1990).
132 Precisely what constitutes a "suspicious transaction" varies according to whether
the customer conducts a currency transaction, or a funds transfer. Examination of some
of the evasive structuring cases indicates what might make a particular currency transac-
tion "suspicious." The indications include multiple purchases of cashier's checks for large
amounts of cash, in amounts of just under $10,000, or large short-term deposits of cur-
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would strike the best balance between the law enforcement inter-
ests at stake, and the economic interests that financial institutions
and their customers have in keeping funds transfers flowing
smoothly and as inexpensively as possible. Tailoring reporting
requirements to a suspicious transfer profile would reduce the
number of transactions financial institutions must report, thus
lessening both the banks' burden and that of the government in
processing and analyzing the reports.
Government experts on financial crimes should assume the
burden of developing the "suspicious transfer" profile. This bur-
den forces the government to decide, and to enunciate, its exact
concerns to financial institutions, rather than leaving them to
guess at what they should consider to be "suspicious," and thus
reportable, or having the financial institutions record or report all
wire and electronic transfers. Applying a suspicious transaction
profile to a funds transfer is arguably more difficult than applying
it to a currency transaction."' Yet, at least, banks can be alert
to patterns of suspicious activity, and report transfers that fit such
patterns. These patterns might include a surge of transfers to
financial institutions in a particular offshore money laundering
"hot spot," previously identified by the government, or a high
volume of activity by a customer the bank knows little about.
Publishing suspicious transfer profiles to banks may also encour-
age banks to report suspicious activity on their own initiative,
even where the activity that attracted bank officials' attention does
not strictly conform to the Treasury's profile of what must be
reported.
3 4
Exemptions from recording and reporting also should be part
of the Treasury Department's plan for addressing wire and
rency that do not seem commensurate with the nature of the depositor's business.
Indications of suspicious wire transfers include the presence of large currency de-
posits prior to an outgoing transfer, or the existence of an incoming transfer followed
by issuance of a cashier's check. It will be more difficult to determine whether a particu-
lar funds transfer, as opposed to a currency transaction, is "suspicious" or not, before
the transfer is made, because the funds transfer system is so highly automated, and it
does not necessarily include manual review of payment orders. Delaying a transfer in
order to examine and verify information would disrupt international payments. Many
financial institutions have indicated that their internal computer systems are not integrat-
ed, and thus they cannot determine what account activity preceded a particular funds
transfer. See 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696, at 41,697-98 (1990).
133 See supra note 132.
134 For an example, see supra note 29 and accompanying text. See also infra note
145 and accompanying text.
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electronic funds transfers. Allowing exemptions for certain broad
classes of transactions would be consistent with the goal of reduc-
ing recordkeeping and processing, in order to limit the cost of
the Treasury Department's anti-laundering measures. Exempted
transfers could include transfers by large, publicly traded corpora-
tions, public utilities, and similar entities that routinely conduct high-
volume transfers.
3 5
The Treasury Department should also consider imposing a
monetary threshold on transfers for which banks must keep de-
tailed records. If the threshold were low enough, it would elimi-
nate useless paperwork for both banks and the government, with-
out compromising the goal of preventing evasive structuring.
Small, one-time consumer transactions, or emergency
transmissions of funds to a stranded traveler, in amounts under
$1000, for example, would not have to be reported, or recorded
in detail. Yet, a would-be money launderer attempting to divide a
large amount of money into such small increments would have to
conduct so many transactions, with such frequency, that the laun-
derer would probably attract the attention of bank officials.
An approach to the electronic and wire transfer problem that
incorporates these reasonable limits would eliminate much of the
unnecessary recordkeeping that the current proposals136 make in-
evitable.' This approach would limit the danger of crippling
the international banking system by slowing down all wire and
electronic funds transfers. 8  Reasonable limits on
recordkeeping, and reporting only those funds transfers that fit a
defined "suspicious transfer" profile, would conform the
government's strategy to the experience of both bankers and law
135 See 55 Fed. Reg. 41696, at 41,697 (1990).
136 E-g., the proposals that the Treasury Department published in October, 1990. See
supra note 110. The period for public comment on the October, 1990, proposals closed
on January 15, 1991. As of January 10, 1991, the Treasury had received over 300 com-
ments on these proposed rules and expected that the proposed requirements will be
amended again. Telephone interview with Linda Noonan, Senior Counsel for Financial
Enforcement, Office of the Assistant General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury
(Jan. 10, 1991).
137 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. The vast volume of international trans-
fers, and the fact that most of these represent legitimate business transactions, means
that most of the records that financial institutions would be required to make, under the
Treasury Department's electronic funds transfer proposals, would never have any law en-
forcement value.
138 American bankers are not the only ones concerned about the effects of slowing
down electronic funds transfers. See, e.g., Debusmann, U.S. Wants Europe to Fight Harder
in International Drug War, REUTERS LBR. REP., Feb. 26, 1990.
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enforcement authorities who have investigated money laundering
operations.
As this Note mentioned," 9 the La Mina information came
from a curious courier company employee, and an alert banker.
Cash surpluses at Federal Reserve Banks also provide an indica-
tion of where money laundering can be occurring. 4 °  In
Varbel,"' an anonymous tip, followed by an undercover investi-
gation, exposed Duane Varbel's money laundering activities. Pub-
licity surrounding the Bank of Credit and Commerce Internation-
al (BCCI)142 and La Mina cases has made both bankers and the
general public more aware of money laundering activity. Banks'
own "know your customer" policies can prevent "dirty money"
from getting into the banking system in the first place. 4 Both
bankers and law enforcement authorities have said that this
"choke point," the point at which illegal-source cash first enters
the banking system, is the crucial point for detecting and prevent-
139 For a discussion of La Mina, see supra notes 28-29, and accompanying text.
140 For a discussion of how Federal Reserve Bank surpluses can indicate money laun-
dering activity, see supra note 64.
141 United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of Varbel,
see supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.% Undercover operations continue to be
successful at catching those who try to launder illegal-source cash. Recent money laun-
dering indictments in Miami resulted from a DEA investigation that connected drug
trafficking activities to attempts to launder approximately $65 million. Federal agents set
up sham "money laundering" operations as part of their investigation. US Juty Indicts 43
in Money Laundering, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1991, at Ag, col. 6.
142 BCCI pleaded guilty in January, 1990, to money laundering charges. In July,
1990, six BCCI bankers, including Manuel Noriega's personal banker, were convicted of
conspiracy to launder $32 million in cocaine profits for Colombia's Medellin cartel. It
was the first time a United States court convicted international bankers under United
States money laundering laws. BCCI was owned by interests in Abu Dhabi, had its head-
quarters in Luxembourg, and had 400 branches in seventy-three countries. Noriega Bank-
er, 5 Others Guilty in Cash Laundering, LA. Times, July 30, 1990, at A17, col.l.
143 As the term suggests, the idea behind a "know-your-customer" policy is that
banks should make an effort to be familiar with their customers, and their customers'
business, so that the bank does not become the unwitting instrument of money launder-
ers. See, e.g., Morley, Suspicious Transactions Pose Dilemma for Banks, MONEY LAUNDERING
ALERT, Jan. 1990, at 5. Charles Morley is a former IRS and Senate investigator who has
produced a videotape' training series for banks, entided "Dirty Money." See also Wells Pio-
neers Detection System, supra note 29. Bankers do not want to intrude on the privacy of
their customers. John Byrne, the general legislative counsel for the American Bankers
Association, has commented, "We're walking a fine line. We're trying to work with the
Government, but we're not policemen." Labaton, Fighting the Battle of Dirty Money, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 27, 1989, at Cl, col. 2. Yet the "know-your-customer" approach has the
advantage, for bankers, of allowing them to apply their own professional judgment in
order to keep dirty money out of the banking system, rather than being controlled en-
tirely by government directives for this purpose.
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ing attempted money laundering.144
V. CONCLUSION
Banks have demonstrated their image-consciousness and their
desire to avoid being associated with money laundering, and the
drug trafficking that is often behind it. 145 Thus, bankers have a
strong incentive to comply with the recording and recordkeeping
requirements that are now in place, and to monitor their own
individual institutions to avoid being used by money launderers. If
the government continues its aggressive investigation and prosecu-
tion of money laundering activity, the incentive to avoid criminal
liability and negative publicity should be sufficient to counter
banks' financial incentive to accept short-term deposits of large
amounts of cash without asking too many questions. Guidance
from law enforcement as to what the government deems to be
"suspicious," combined with the applied expertise of banking
professionals, can help keep dirty money out of the system. The
answer to the money laundering problem lies not with more blan-
ket recording and reporting requirements, but with "smarter,"
targeted regulations, and with the encouragement of "know your
customer" policies.
Laura M.L. Maroldy
144 See, e.g., Labaton, Fighting the Battle of Dirty Money, supra note 143.
145 See, e.g., Hilsher, Know the Telltale Signs of Laundering, AMERICAN BANKER, July 24,
1989, at 24. Gerald L. Hilsher is an attorney who previously served as the Treasury
Department's deputy assistant secretary for law enforcement. He notes that in the wake
of "Operation C-Chase," which led to the conviction of BCCI on money laundering
charges, the Treasury Department served subpoenas on more than forty United States
banks. Id. Hilsher states that despite Treasury Department assurances that the subpoenas
in no way indicated criminal culpability by the banks holding the records, the press re-
ported the service of subpoenas and the seizure of bank accounts in a way that suggest-
ed complicity with the laundering defendants. Id.
The broad sweep of money laundering investigations is conducive to dramatic head-
lines. See, e.g., Frantz, IRS Subpoenas Records of California Banks in Broad Money-Laundering
Probe, LA. Times, Oct. 4, 1988, at DI, col. 4. See also Fialka & Truell, Rogue Bank: BCCI
Took Deposits from Drugs, Noriega, and Now is in the Red, Wall St. J., May 3, 1990, at Al,
col 6.
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